Within the past two years, important advances have been made in modeling credit risk at the portfolio level. Practitioners and policy makers have invested in implementing and exploring a variety of new models individually. Less progress has been made, however, with comparative analyses. Direct comparison often is not straightforward, because the dierent models may be presented within rather dierent mathematical frameworks. This paper oers a comparative anatomy of two especially in¯uential benchmarks for credit risk models, the RiskMetrics Group's CreditMetrics and Credit Suisse Financial Product's CreditRisk . We show that, despite dierences on the surface, the underlying mathematical structures are similar. The structural parallels provide intuition for the relationship between the two models and allow us to describe quite precisely where the models dier in functional form, distributional assumptions, and reliance on approximation formulae. We then design simulation exercises which evaluate the eect of each of these dierences individually. Ó
Introduction
Over the past decade, ®nancial institutions have developed and implemented a variety of sophisticated models of value-at-risk for market risk in trading portfolios. These models have gained acceptance not only among senior bank Journal of Banking & Finance 24 (2000) 119±149 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase managers, but also in amendments to the international bank regulatory framework. Much more recently, important advances have been made in modeling credit risk in lending portfolios. The new models are designed to quantify credit risk on a portfolio basis, and thus have application in control of risk concentration, evaluation of return on capital at the customer level, and more active management of credit portfolios. Future generations of today's models may one day become the foundation for measurement of regulatory capital adequacy. Two of the models, the RiskMetrics Group's CreditMetrics and Credit Suisse Financial Product's CreditRisk , have been released freely to the public since 1997 and have quickly become in¯uential benchmarks. Practitioners and policy makers have invested in implementing and exploring each of the models individually, but have made less progress with comparative analyses. The two models are intended to measure the same risks, but impose dierent restrictions and distributional assumptions, and suggest dierent techniques for calibration and solution. Thus, given the same portfolio of credit exposures, the two models will, in general, yield diering evaluations of credit risk. Determining which features of the models account for dierences in output would allow us a better understanding of the sensitivity of the models to the particular assumptions they employ.
Direct comparison of the models has so far been limited, in large part, because the two models are presented within rather dierent mathematical frameworks. The CreditMetrics model is familiar to econometricians as an ordered probit model. Credit events are driven by movements in underlying unobserved latent variables. The latent variables are assumed to depend on external``risk factors''. Common dependence on the same risk factors gives rise to correlations in credit events across obligors. The CreditRisk model is based instead on insurance industry models of event risk. Instead of a latent variable, each obligor has a default probability. The default probabilities are not constant over time, but rather increase or decrease in response to background systemic factors. To the extent that two obligors are sensitive to the same set of background factors, their default probabilities will move together. These comovements in probability give rise to correlations in defaults. CreditMetrics and CreditRisk may serve essentially the same function, but they appear to be constructed quite dierently. This paper oers a comparative anatomy of CreditMetrics and CreditRisk . We show that, despite dierences on the surface, the underlying probabilistic structures are similar. Understanding the structural parallels helps to develop intuition for the relationship between the two models. More importantly, it allows us to describe quite precisely where the models dier in functional form, distributional assumptions, and reliance on approximation formulae. We then design simulation exercises which evaluate the eect of each of these dierences individually.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the CreditRisk model and introduces a restricted version of CreditMetrics. The restrictions are imposed to facilitate direct comparison of CreditMetrics and CreditRisk . While some of the richness of the full CreditMetrics implementation is sacri®ced, the essential mathematical characteristics of the model are preserved. Our method of comparative anatomy is developed in Section 3. We show how the restricted version of CreditMetrics can be run through the mathematical machinery of CreditRisk , and vice versa. Comparative simulations are developed in Section 4. Care is taken to construct portfolios with quality and loan size distributions similar to real bank portfolios, and to calibrate correlation parameters in the two models in an empirically plausible and mutually consistent manner. The robustness of the conclusions of Section 4 to our methods of portfolio construction and parameter calibration are explored in Section 5. An especially striking result from the simulations is the sensitivity of CreditRisk results to the shape of the distribution of a systemic risk factor. The reasons for and consequences of this sensitivity are explored in Section 6. We conclude with a summary of the main results of the simulations.
Summary of the models
This section oers an introduction to CreditRisk and CreditMetrics. The discussion of CreditRisk merely summarizes the derivation presented in CSFP (1997, Appendix A). Our presentation of CreditMetrics sets forth a restricted version of the full model described in the CreditMetrics Technical Document (Gupton et al., 1997) . Our choice of notation is intended to facilitate comparison of the models, and may dier considerably from what is used in the original manuals.
Summary of CreditRisk
CreditRisk is a model of default risk. Each obligor has only two possible end-of-period states, default and non-default. In the event of default, the lender suers a loss of ®xed size, this is the lender's exposure to the obligor. The distributional assumptions and functional forms imposed by CreditRisk allow the distribution of total portfolio losses to be calculated in a convenient analytic form.
Default correlations in CreditRisk are assumed to be driven entirely by a vector of K``risk factors'' x x 1 Y F F F Y x u . Conditional on x, defaults of individual obligors are assumed to be independently distributed Bernoulli draws. The conditional probability p i x of drawing a default for obligor i is a function of the rating grade fi of obligor i, the realization of risk factors x, and the vector of``factor loadings'' w i1 Y F F F Y w iu which measure the sensitivity of obligor i to each of the risk factors. CreditRisk speci®es this function as
where " p f is the unconditional default probability for a grade f obligor, and the x are positive-valued with mean one. The intuition behind this speci®cation is that the risk factors x serve to``scale up'' or``scale down'' the unconditional " p f . A high draw of x k (over one) increases the probability of default for each obligor in proportion to the obligor's weight w ik on that risk factor, a low draw of x k (under one) scales down all default probabilities. The weights w ik are required to sum to one for each obligor, which guarantees that ip i x " p fi . Rather than calculating the distribution of defaults directly, CreditRisk calculates the probability generating function (``pgf'') for defaults. The pgf F j z of a discrete random variable j is a function of an auxilliary variable z such that the probability that j n is given by the coecient on z n in the polynomial expansion of F j z. The pgf has two especially useful properties: 1 · If j 1 and j 2 are independent random variables, then the pgf of the sum j 1 j 2 is equal to the product of the two pgfs. · If F j zjx is the pgf of j conditional on x, and x has distribution function r x, then the unconditional pgf is simply F j z x F j zjx dr x. We ®rst derive the conditional pgf Fzjx for the total number of defaults in the portfolio given realization x of the risk factors. For a single obligor i, this is the Bernoullip i x pgf:
Using the approximation formula log 1 y % y for y % 0, we can write
We refer to this step as the``Poisson approximation'' because the expression on the right-hand side is the pgf for a random variable distributed Poissonp i x. The intuition is that, as long as p i x is small, we can ignore the constraint that a single obligor can default only once, and represent its default event as a Poisson random variable rather than as a Bernoulli. The exponential form of the Poisson pgf is essential to the computational facility of the model. Conditional on x, default events are independent across obligors, so the pgf of the sum of obligor defaults is the product of the individual pgfs:
where lx i p i xX To get the unconditional probability generating function Fz, we integrate out the x. The risk factors in CreditRisk are assumed to be independent gamma-distributed random variables with mean one and variance r
2 See Appendix A on the properties and parameterization of the gamma distribution. It is straightforward to show that
The form of this pgf shows that the total number of defaults in the portfolio is a sum of K independent negative binomial variables. The ®nal step in CreditRisk is to obtain the probability generating function Gz for losses. Assume loss given default is a constant fraction k of loan size. Let v i denote the loan size for obligor i. In order to retain the computational advantages of the discrete model, we need to express the loss exposure amounts kv i as integer multiples of a ®xed unit of loss (e.g., one million dollars). The base unit of loss is denoted m 0 and its integer multiples are called``standardized exposure'' levels. The standardized exposure for obligor i, denoted mi, is equal to kv i am 0 rounded to the nearest integer.
Let G i denote the probability generating function for losses on obligor i. The probability of a loss of mi units on a portfolio consisting only of obligor i must equal the probability that i defaults, so G i zjx F i z mi jx. We use the conditional independence of the defaults to obtain the conditional pgf for losses in the entire portfolio as
As before, we integrate out the x and rearrange to arrive at
and d k and l k are as de®ned in Eq. (5).
2 This is a variant on the presentation in the CreditRisk manual, in which x k has mean l k and variance r 2 k , and the conditional probabilities are given by p i x " p fi w ik x k al k . In our presentation, the constants 1al k are absorbed into the normalized x k without any loss of generality.
The unconditional probability that there will be n units of m 0 loss in the total portfolio is given by the coecient on z n in the Taylor series expansion of Gz. The CreditRisk manual (Section A.10) provides the recurrence relation used to calculate these coecients.
A restricted version of CreditMetrics
The CreditMetrics model for credit events is familiar to economists as an ordered probit. Associated with obligor i is an unobserved latent random variable y i . The state of obligor i at the risk-horizon depends on the location of y i relative to a set of``cut-o'' values. In the full version of the model, the cutos divide the real number line into``bins'' for each end-of-period rating grade. CreditMetrics thereby captures not only defaults, but migrations across nondefault grades as well. Given a set of forward credit spreads for each grade, CreditMetrics can then estimate a distribution over the change in mark-tomarket value attributable to portfolio credit risk.
In this section, we present a restricted version of CreditMetrics. To allow more direct comparison with CreditRisk , we restrict the set of outcomes to two states, default and non-default. In the event of default, we assume loss is a ®xed fraction k of the face value. This represents a second signi®cant simpli®cation of the full CreditMetrics implementation, which allows idiosyncratic risk in recoveries. 3 In the non-default state, the loan retains its book value. Thus, our restricted version of CreditMetrics is a model of book value losses, rather than of changes in market value. In the discussion below, the restricted CreditMetrics will be designated as``CM2S'' (``CreditMetrics two-state'') whenever distinction from the full CreditMetrics model needs emphasis.
The latent variables y i are taken to be linear functions of risk factors x and idiosyncratic eects i :
The vector of factor loadings w i determines the relative sensitivity of obligor i to the risk factors, and the weight g i determines the relative importance of idiosyncratic risk for the obligor. The x are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance±covariance matrix X. 4 Without loss of generality, assume there are ones on the diagonal of X, so the marginal distributions are all 3 The full CreditMetrics also accommodates more complex asset types, including loan commitments and derivatives contracts. See the CreditMetrics Technical Document, Chapter 4, and Finger (1998). These features are not addressed in this paper. 4 In the CreditMetrics Technical Document, it is recommended that the x be taken to be stock market indexes, because the ready availability of historical data on stock indexes simpli®es calibration of the covariance matrix X and the weights w i . The mathematical framework of the model, however, imposes no speci®c identity on the x. N(0, 1). The i are assumed to be iid N(0, 1). Again without loss of generality, it is imposed that y i has variance 1 (i.e., that w H i Xw i g 2 i 1. Associated with each start-of-period rating grade f is a cut-o value g f . When the latent variable y i falls under the cut-o g fi , the obligor defaults. That is, default occurs if
The g f values are set so that the unconditional default probability for a grade f obligor is " p f , i.e., so that " p f Ug f , where U is the standard normal cdf and the " p f are de®ned as in Section 2.1. The model is estimated by Monte Carlo simulation. To obtain a single trial for the portfolio, we ®rst draw a single vector x as a multivariate N(0, X) and a set of iid N(0, 1) idiosyncratic . We form the latent y i for each obligor, which are compared against the cut-o values g fi to determine default status h i (one for default, zero otherwise). Portfolio loss for this trial is given by i h i kv i . To estimate a distribution of portfolio outcomes, we repeat this process many times. The portfolio losses for each trial are sorted to form a cumulative distribution for loss. For example, if the portfolio is simulated 100,000 times, then the estimated 99.5th percentile of the loss distribution is given by the 99,500th element of the sorted loss outcomes.
Mapping between the models
Presentation of the restricted version of CreditMetrics and the use of a similar notation in outlining the models both serve to emphasize the fundamental similarities between CreditMetrics and CreditRisk . Nonetheless, there remain substantial dierences in the mathematical methods used in each, which tend to obscure comparison of the models. In the ®rst two parts of this section, we map each model into the mathematical framework of the other. We conclude this section with a comparative analysis in which fundamental dierences between the models in functional form and distributional assumptions are distinguished from dierences in technique for calibration and solution.
Mapping CreditMetrics to the CreditRisk framework
To map the restricted CM2S model into the CreditRisk framework, we need to derive the implied conditional default probability function p i x used in Eq. (3). 5 Conditional on x, rearrangement of Eq. (9) shows that obligor i defaults if and only if i` g fi À xw i ag i . Because the i are standard normal variates, default occurs with conditional probability
The CreditRisk methodology can now be applied in a straightforward manner. Conditional on x, default events are independent across obligors. Therefore, the conditional probability generating function for defaults, Fzjx, takes on exactly the same Poisson approximation form as in Eq. (4). To get the unconditional probability generating function Fz, we integrate out the x:
where / X is the multivariate N(0, X) pdf. The unconditional probability that exactly n defaults will occur in the portfolio is given by the coecient on z n in the Taylor series expansion of Fz:
where lx i p i x. These K-dimensional integrals are analytically intractable (even when the number of systemic factors K 1), and in practice would be solved using Monte Carlo techniques. 6 The remaining steps in CreditRisk would follow similarly. That is, one would round loss exposures to integer multiples of a base unit m 0 , apply the rule G i zjx F i z mi jx and multiply pgfs across obligors to get Gzjx. To get the unconditional pgf of losses, we integrate out the x as in Eq. (12). The result would be computationally unwieldy, but application of the method is conceptually straightforward.
Mapping CreditRisk to the CreditMetrics framework
Translating in the opposite direction is equally straightforward. To go from CreditRisk into the CM2S framework, we assign to obligor i a latent variable y i de®ned by
The x k and w ik are the same gamma-distributed risk factors and factor loadings used in CreditRisk . The idiosyncratic risk factors i are independently and identically distributed Exponential with parameter 1. Obligor i defaults if and only if y i`" p fi . Observe that the conditional probability of default is given by
where the second line follows using the cdf for the exponential distribution, and the last line relies on the same approximation formula as Eq. (3). The unconditional probability of default is simply " p fi , as required. In the ordinary CreditMetrics speci®cation, the latent variable is a linear sum of normal random variables. When CreditRisk is mapped to the CreditMetrics framework, the latent variable takes a multiplicative form, but the idea is the same.
7 In CreditMetrics, the cut-o values g f are determined as functions of the associated unconditional default probabilities " p f . Here, the cut-o values are simply the " p f . Other than these dierences in form, the process is identical. A single portfolio simulation trial would consist of a single random draw of sector risk factors and a single vector of random draws of idiosyncratic risk factors. From these, the obligors' latent variables are calculated, and these in turn determine default events. 
Essential and inessential dierences between the models
CreditMetrics and CreditRisk dier in distributional assumptions and functional forms, solution techniques, suggested methods for calibration, and mathematical language. As the preceding analysis makes clear, only the differences in distributional assumptions and functional forms are fundamental.
Each model can be mapped into the mathematical language of the other, which demonstrates that the dierence between the latent variable representation of CreditMetrics and the covarying default probabilities of CreditRisk is one of presentation and not substance. Similarly, methods for parameter calibration suggested in model technical documents are helpful to users, but not in any way intrinsic to the models.
By contrast, distributional assumptions and functional forms are model primitives. In each model, the choice of distribution for the systemic risk factors x and the functional form for the conditional default probabilities p i x together give shape to the joint distribution over obligor defaults in the portfolio. The CreditMetrics speci®cations of normally distributed x and of Eq. (10) for the p i x may be somewhat arbitrary, but nonetheless strongly in¯uence the results.
9 One could substitute any member of the symmetric stable class of distributions (of which the normal distribution is only a special case) without requiring signi®cant change to the CreditMetrics methods of model calibration and simulation. Even if parameters were recalibrated to yield the same mean and variance of portfolio loss, the overall shape of the loss distribution would dier, and therefore the tail percentile values would change as well. The choice of the gamma distribution and the function form for conditional default probabilities given by Eq. (1) are similarly characteristic of CreditRisk . Indeed, in Section 6 we will show how small deviations from the gamma speci®cation lead to signi®cant differences in tail percentile values in a generalized CreditRisk framework. Remaining dierences between the two models are attributable to dierences in solution method. The Monte Carlo method of CreditMetrics is¯exible but computationally intensive. CreditRisk oers the eciency of a closed-form solution, but at the expense of additional restrictions or approximations. In particular, · CreditMetrics allows naturally for multi-state outcomes and for uncertainty in recoveries, whereas the closed-form CreditRisk is a two-state model with ®xed recovery rates. 10 9 Recall that Eq. (10) follows from the speci®cation in Eq. (8) of latent variable y i and the assumption of normally distribution idiosyncratic i . Therefore, this discussion incorporates those elements of the CreditMetrics model. 10 In principle, both restrictions in CreditRisk can be relaxed without resorting to a Monte Carlo methodology. It is feasible to introduce idiosyncratic risk in recoveries to CreditRisk , but probably at the expense of the computational facility of the model. CreditRisk also can be extended to, say, a three-state model in which the third state represents a severe downgrade (short of default). However, CreditRisk cannot capture the exclusive nature of the outcomes (i.e., one cannot impose the mutual exclusivity of a severe downgrade and default). For this reason, as well as the Poisson approximation, the third state would need to represent a low probability event. Thus, it would be impractical to model ordinary rating migrations in CreditRisk .
· CreditRisk imposes a``Poisson approximation'' on the conditional distribution of defaults. · CreditRisk rounds each obligor's loan loss exposure to the nearest element in a ®nite set of values. Using the techniques of Section 3.2, it is straightforward to construct a Monte Carlo version of CreditRisk which avoids Poisson and loss exposure approximations and allows recovery risk. It is less straightforward but certainly possible to create a Monte Carlo multi-state generalization of CreditRisk . Because computational convenience may be a signi®cant advantage of CreditRisk for some users, the eect of the Poisson and loss exposure approximations on the accuracy of CreditRisk results will be examined in Sections 5 and 6. However, the eect of multi-state outcomes and recovery uncertainty on the distribution of credit loss will be left for future study. Therefore, our simulations will compare CreditRisk to only the restricted CM2S version of CreditMetrics.
It is worth noting that there is no real loss of generality in the assumption of independence across sector risk factors in CreditRisk . In each model, the vector of factor loadings (w) is free, up to a scaling restriction. In CreditMetrics, the sector risk factors x could be orthogonalized and the correlations incorporated into the w.
11 However, the need to impose orthogonality in CreditRisk does imply that greater care must be given to identifying and calibrating sectoral risks in that model.
Calibration and main simulation results
The remaining sections of this paper study the two models using comparative simulations. The primary goal is to develop reliable intuition for how the two models will dier when applied to real world portfolios. In pursuit of this goal, we also will determine the parameters or portfolio characteristics to which each model is most sensitive. Emphasis is placed on relevance and robustness. By relevance, we mean that the simulated portfolios and calibrated parameters ought to resemble their real world counterparts closely enough for conclusions to be transferable. By robustness, we mean that the conclusions ought to be qualitatively valid over an empirically relevant range of portfolios.
This section will present our main simulations. First, in Section 4.1, we construct a set of``test deck'' portfolios. All assets are assumed to be ordinary term loans. The size distribution of loans and their distribution across S&P rating grades are calibrated using data from two large samples of midsized and large corporate loans. Second, in Section 4.2, default probabilities and corre-lation structures in each model are calibrated using historical default data from the S&P ratings universe. We calibrate each model to a one year risk-horizon. The main simulation results are presented in Section 4.3.
Portfolio construction
Construction of our simulated loan portfolios requires choices along three dimensions. The ®rst is credit quality, i.e., the portion of total dollar outstandings in each rating grade. The second is obligor count, i.e., the total number of obligors in the portfolio. The third is concentration, i.e., the distribution of dollar outstandings within a rating grade across the obligors within that grade. Note that the total portfolio dollar outstandings is immaterial, because losses will be calculated as a percentage of total outstandings.
The range of plausible credit quality is represented by four credit quality distributions, which are labelled``High'',``Average'',``Low'' and``Very Low''. The ®rst three distributions are constructed using data from internal Federal Reserve Board surveys of large banking organizations.
12 The``Average'' distribution is the average distribution across the surveyed banks of total outstandings in each S&P grade. The``High'' and``Low'' distributions are drawn from the higher and lower quality distributions found among the banks in the sample. The``Very Low'' distribution is not found in the Federal Reserve sample, but is intended to represent a very weak large bank loan portfolio during a recession. Speculative grade (BB and below) loans account for half of outstandings in the``Average'' portfolio, and 25%, 78% and 83% in thè`H igh'',``Low'',``Very Low'' quality portfolios, respectively. The distributions are depicted in Fig. 1 .
Realistic calibration of obligor count is likely to depend not only on the size of the hypothetical bank, but also on the bank's business focus. A very large bank with a strong middle-market business might have tens of thousands of rated obligors in its commercial portfolio. A bank of the same size specializing in the large corporate market might have only a few thousand. For the``base case'' calibration, we set N 5000. To establish robustness of the conclusions to the choice of N, we model portfolios of 1000 and 10,000 obligors as well. In all simulations, we assume each obligor is associated with only one loan in the portfolio.
Portfolio concentration is calibrated in two stages. First, we divide the total number of obligors N across the rating grades. Second, for each rating grade, we determine how the total exposure within the grade is distributed across the number of obligors in the grade. In both stages, distributions are calibrated using the Society of Actuaries (1996, hereafter cited as``SoA'') sample of midsized and large private placement loans (see also Carey, 1998) .
Let q f be the dollar volume of exposure to rating grade f as a share of total portfolio exposure (determined by the chosen``credit quality distribution''), and let v f be the mean book value of loans in rating grade f in the SoA data. We determine n f , the number of obligors in rating grade f, by imposing
for all f. That is, the n f are chosen so that, in a portfolio with mean loan sizes in each grade matching the SoA mean sizes, the exposure share of that grade matches the desired share q f . The equations of form (15) are easily transformed into a set of six linearly independent equations and seven unknown n f values (using the S&P eight grade scale). Given the restriction n f x , the vector n is uniquely determined.
13 Table 1 shows the values of the vector n associated with each credit quality distribution when N 5000.
The ®nal step is to distribute the q f share of total loan exposure across the n f obligors in each grade. For our``base case'' calibration, the distribution within grade f is chosen to match (up to a scaling factor) the distribution for grade f exposures in the SoA data. The SoA loans in grade f are sorted from smallest to largest, and used to form a cumulative distribution r f . The size of the jth exposure, j 1Y F F F Y n f , is set to the j À 1a2an f percentile of r f .
14 Finally, the Fig. 1 . Credit quality distributions.
13 After solving the system of linear equations, the values of n f are rounded to whole numbers. 14 For example, say n f 200 and there are 6143 loans in the grade f SoA sample. To set the size of, say, the seventh (j 7) simulated loan, we calculate the index j À 1a26143an f % 199X65. The loan size is then formed as an interpolated value between the 199th and 200th loans in the SoA vector.
n f loan sizes are normalized to sum to q f . This method ensures that the shape of the distribution of loan sizes will not be sensitive to the choice of n f (unless n f is very small). As an alternative to the base case, we also model a portfolio in which all loans within a rating grade are equal-sized, i.e., each loan in grade f is of size q f an f .
In all simulations below, it is assumed that loss given default is a ®xed proportion k 0X3 of book value, which is consistent with historical loss given default experience for senior unsecured bank loans.
15 Percentile values on the simulated loss distributions are directly proportional to k. Holding ®xed all other model parameters and the permitted probability of bank insolvency, the required capital given a loss rate of, say, k 0X45 would simply be 1.5 times the required capital given k 0X3.
It should be emphasized that the SoA data are used to impose shape, but not scale, on the distributions of loan sizes. The ratio of the mean loan size in grade f 1 to the mean loan size in grade f 2 is determined by the corresponding ratio in the SoA sample. Within each grade, SoA data determine the ratio of any two percentile values of loan size (e.g., the 75th percentile to the median). However, measures of portfolio concentration (e.g., the ratio of the sum of the largest j loans to the total portfolio value) depend strongly on the choice of N, and thus not only on SoA sample.
Finally, CreditRisk requires a discretization of the distribution of exposures, i.e., the selection of the base unit of loss m 0 . In the main set of simulations, we will set m 0 to k times the ®fth percentile value of the distribution of loan sizes. In Section 5, it will be shown that simulation results are quite robust to the choice of m 0 . 
Default probabilites and correlations
In any model of portfolio credit risk, the structure of default rate correlations is an important determinant of the distribution of losses. Special attention must therefore be given to mutually consistent calibration of parameters which determine default correlations. In the exercises below, we calibrate CreditMetrics and CreditRisk to yield the same unconditional expected default rate for an obligor of a given rating grade, and the same default correlation between any two obligors within a single rating grade. 16 For simplicity, we assume a single systemic risk factor x.
17 Within each rating grade, obligors are statistically identical (except for loan size). That is, every obligor of grade f has unconditional default probability " p f and has the same weight w f on the systemic risk factor. (The value of w f will, of course, depend on the choice of model.) The " p values are set to the long-term average annual default probabilities given in Table 6 .9 of the CreditMetrics Technical Document, and are shown below in the ®rst column of Table 2 . For a portfolio of loans, this is likely to be a relatively conservative calibration of mean annual default probabilities.
18
The weights w f are calibrated for each model by working backwards from the historical volatility of annual default rates in each rating grade. First, using data in Brand and Bahar (1998 , Table 12 ) on historical default experience in each grade, we estimate the variance f of the conditional default rate p f x. The estimation method and results are described in Appendix B. For calibration purposes, the default rate volatilities are most conveniently expressed as normalized standard deviations f p a " p f . The values assumed in the simulations are shown in the second column of Table 2 , and the implied default correlations q f for any two obligors in the same rating grade are shown in the third column. To con®rm the qualitative robustness of the results, additional simulations will be presented in Section 5 in which the assumed normalized volatilities are twice the values used here.
The second step in determining the w f is model-dependent. To calibrate the CreditMetrics weights, we use Proposition 1: Proposition 1. sn the greditwetris model,
16 Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998) also use these two moments to harmonize calibration of somewhat more restrictive versions of the two models.
17 This is in the same spirit as the``Z-risk'' approach of Belkin et al. (1998) . 18 Carey (1998) observes that default rates on speculative grade private placement loans tend to be lower than on publicly held bonds of the same senior unsecured rating, and attributes this superior performance to closer monitoring.
where Uz 1 Y z 2 Y q is the ivrite norml df for 1 2 H suh tht
The proof is given in Appendix C. Given the cut-o values g f (which are functions of the " p f ) and normalized volatilities p f a" p f , non-negative w f are uniquely determined by the non-linear Eq. (16). The solutions are shown in the fourth column of Table 2 .
In CreditRisk , a model with a single systemic risk factor and obligorspeci®c idiosyncratic risk can be parameterized¯exibly as a two risk factor model in which the ®rst risk factor has zero volatility and thus always equals one.
19 Let w f be the weights on x 2 (which are constant across obligors within a grade but allowed to vary across grades), so the weights on x 1 are 1 À w f . To simplify notation, we set the ®rst risk factor x 1 identically equal to one, and denote the second risk factor x 2 as x and the standard deviation r 2 of x 2 as r. Under this speci®cation, the variance of the default probability in CreditRisk for a grade f obligor is
so the normalized volatility p f a " p f equals w f r. Given r, the weights w f are uniquely determined. However, there is no obvious additional information to bring to the choice of r. This might appear Table 6 .9, and are expressed here in percentage points. Historical experience for default rate volatility derived from Brand and Bahar (1998, Table 12 ), as described below in Appendix B.
19 See the CreditRisk manual, Section A12.3. The ®rst factor is referred to as a``speci®c factor''. Because it represents diversi®able risk, it contributes no volatility to a well diversi®ed portfolio.
to make little or no dierence, because the volatility of the default probabilities depends only on the product w f r. However, because r controls the shape (and not merely the scale) of the distribution of x, higher moments of the distribution of p i x depend directly on r and not only on the product (w f r). Consequently, tail probabilities for portfolio loss are quite sensitive to the choice of r. To illustrate this sensitivity, simulation results will be presented for three values of r (1.0, 1.5, and 4.0). See the last three columns of Table 2 for the values of w f corresponding to each of these r (with w f r held constant) and the grade-speci®c normalized volatilities.
In the CreditRisk manual, Section A7.3, it is suggested that r is roughly one. This estimate is based on a single-sector calibration of the model, which is equivalent to setting all the w f to one. The exposure-weighted average of values in the second column of Table 2 would then be a reasonable calibration of r. For most portfolios, this would yield r % 1, as suggested. Our speci®cation is strictly more general than the single-sector approach, because it allows the relative importance of systemic risk to vary across rating grades, and also is more directly comparable to our calibrated correlation structure for CreditMetrics. Note that the diculty of calibrating r in this more general speci®cation should not be interpreted as a disadvantage to CreditRisk relative to CreditMetrics, because CreditMetrics avoids this calibration issue by ®at. In assuming the normal distribution for the systemic risk factor, CreditMetrics is indeed imposing very strong restrictions on the shape of the distribution tail.
When r 1 is used in our calibration of CreditRisk , a problem arises in that some of the factor loadings exceed one. Such values imply negative weights on the speci®c factors, which violate both intuition and the formal assumptions of the model. However, CreditRisk can tolerate negative weights so long as all coecients in the polynomial expansion of the portfolio loss probability generating function remain positive 20 . For the weights in the r 1 column, we have con®rmed numerically that our simulations always produce valid loss distributions.
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To users of CreditRisk , this``top-down'' approach to calibration should seem entirely natural. Users of CreditMetrics, however, may ®nd it some what alien. The design of CreditMetrics facilitates a detailed speci®cation of risk factors (e.g., to represent industry-and country-speci®c risks), and thereby encourages a``bottom-up'' style of calibration. From a mathematical pointof-view, top-down calibration of CreditMetrics is equally valid, and is convenient for purposes of comparison with CreditRisk . As an empirical matter, a top-down approach ought to work as well as a bottom-up approach on a broadly diversi®ed bond portfolio, because the top-down within-grade default correlation should roughly equal the average of the bottom-up default correlations among obligors within that grade. The bottom-up approach, however, is better suited to portfolios with industry or geographic concentrations.
Another limitation of our method of calibration is that it makes no use of historical default correlations between obligors of dierent grades. Cross-grade default correlations are determined as artifacts of the models' functional forms for p f x, the assumption of a single systemic risk factor, and the chosen factor loadings. In general, our calibrations for CreditMetrics and CreditRisk yield quite similar cross-grade default correlations, but there are discrepancies for some cells. For example, the default correlation between a BB issuer and a CCC issuer is 0.0204 in CreditMetrics and 0.0222 in CreditRisk . Thus, while our method equalizes variance of loss across the two models given homogeneous (i.e., single grade) portfolios, there will be slight dierences given mixedgrade portfolios.
Main simulation results
Results for the main set of simulations are displayed in Table 3 . 22 Each quadrant of the table shows summary statistics and selected percentile values for CreditMetrics and CreditRisk portfolio loss distributions for a portfolio of a given credit quality distribution. The summary statistics are the mean, standard deviation, index of skewness and index of kurtosis. The latter two are de®ned for a random variable y by
Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of a distribution, and kurtosis is a measure of the relative thickness of the tails of the distribution. For portfolio 22 In these simulations, there are x 5000 loans in the portfolio, grade-speci®c loan size distributions are taken from the SoA sample, average severity of loss is held constant at 30%, and the weights w f and CreditRisk parameter r are taken from Table 2 . CreditMetrics distributions are formed using 200,000 portfolio trials. credit risk models, high kurtosis indicates a relatively high probability of very large credit losses. These summary statistics are calculated analytically for the CreditRisk model using the results of Gordy (1999), and are approximated for CreditMetrics from the Monte Carlo loss distribution.
The percentile values presented in the table are the loss levels associated with the 50% (median), 75%, 95%, 99%, 99.5% and 99.97% points on the cumulative distribution of portfolio losses. In many discussions of credit risk modeling, the 99th and sometimes the 95th percentiles of the distribution are taken as points of special interest. The 99.5th and 99.97th percentiles may appear to be extreme tail values, but are in fact of greater practical interest than the 99th percentile. To merit an AA rating, an institution must have a probability of default over a one year horizon of roughly three basis points (0.03%).
23 Such an institution therefore ought to hold capital (or reserves) against credit loss equal to the 99.97th percentile value. Capitalization sucient to absorb up to the 99.5th percentile value of losses would be consistent with only a BBB-rating. Table 3 , for the Average quality portfolio, illustrates the qualitative characteristics of the main results. The expected loss under either model is roughly 48 basis points of the portfolio book value. 24 The standard deviation of loss is roughly 32 basis points. When the CreditRisk parameter r is set to 1, the two models predict roughly similar loss distributions overall. The 99.5th and 99.97th percentile values are roughly 1.8% and 2.7% of portfolio book value in each case. As r increases, however, the CreditRisk distribution becomes increasingly kurtotic. The standard deviation of loss remains the same, but tail percentile values increase substantially. The 99.5th and 99.97th CreditRisk percentile values given r 4X0 are respectively 40% and 90% larger than the corresponding CreditMetrics values.
High, Low, and Very Low quality portfolios produce dierent expected losses (19, 93, and 111 basis points, respectively), but similar overall conclusions regarding our comparison of the two models. CreditRisk with r 1X0 produces distributions roughly similar to those of CreditMetrics, although as credit quality deteriorates the extreme percentile values in CreditRisk increase more quickly than in CreditMetrics. As r increases, so do the extreme loss percentiles.
Overall, capital requirements implied by these simulations may seem relatively low. Even with a Low quality portfolio, a bank would need to hold only 4.5±6% capital against credit risk in order to maintain an AA rating standard. 25 It should be noted, however, that these simulations assume uniform default correlations within each rating grade. In real world portfolios, there may sometimes be pockets of higher default correlation, due perhaps to imperfect geographic or industry diversi®cation. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that these simulations incorporate only default risk, and thus additional capital must be held for other forms of risk, including market risk, operational risk, and recovery uncertainty. 
Robustness of model results
In this section, we explore the sensitivity of the models to parameter calibration and portfolio construction.
yligor ount: Compared to portfolios of equities, loan portfolios can be quite large and still receive substantial diversi®cation bene®ts from adding more obligors.
26 Table 4 compares CreditMetrics and CreditRisk results for Average quality portfolios of 1000, 5000, and 10,000 obligors. Even with portfolios of this size, increasing the number of obligors reduces risk signi®-cantly. The standard deviation of the 10,000 obligor portfolio is roughly 20% less than that of the 1000 obligor portfolio, and the 99.5th and 99.97th percentile values fall by 13±15%. However, the qualitative nature of the results, particularly the comparison between the two models, remains unchanged.
von size distriution: The loan size distributions derived from the SoA data are likely to be somewhat skew in comparison with real bank portfolios. For x 5000, the largest loans are over 0.65% of the portfolio, which is not much below supervisory concentration limits. To examine the eect of loan size distribution, we construct portfolios in which all loans within a single rating grade have the same size. Results are shown in Table 5 for Average quality portfolios. The tail percentiles are somewhat lower for the equal-sized portfolios, but, if one considers the magnitude of dierence between the two loansize distributions, the dierence in model outputs seems minor. These results suggest that, with real bank portfolios, neither model is especially sensitive to the distribution of loan sizes.
xormlized voltilities: Due to the empirical diculty of estimating default correlations with precision, practioners may be especially concerned with the sensitivity of the results to the values of the normalized volatilities in Table 2 . Therefore, we calibrate and run a set of simulations in which normalized volatilities are double the values used above. CreditMetrics weights w f increase substantially, though not quite proportionately. 27 We retain the same CreditRisk w f values given in the last three columns of Table 2 , but double the respective r values.
Results are presented in Table 6 for the Average quality portfolio. As should be expected, extreme tail percentile values increase substantially. Compared to the values in Table 3 , the 99.97th percentile values nearly triple. Similar increases in tail percentile values are observed for the other credit quality distributions. 26 Essentially, this is because risk in loans is dominated by large changes in value which occur with relatively low probability. The skew distribution of individual losses allow the tail of the portfolio loss distribution to thin with diversi®cation at only a relatively slow rate. 27 Due to the nonlinearity of the normal cdf, a given percentage increase in the normalized volatility is generally associated with a somewhat smaller percentage increase in the weight on x.
hisretiztion of lon sizes: In the main simulations, the CreditRisk base exposure unit is set to k times the ®fth percentile value of the distribution of loan sizes. At least locally, the error introduced by this discretization is negligible. We have run most of our simulations with m 0 set to k times the 2.5th and 10th percentile values. For both these alternatives, the percentile values of the loss distribution diered from those of the main simulations by no more than 0.0005.
Modi®ed CreditRisk speci®cations
The analysis of Section 4.3 demonstrates the sensitivity of CreditRisk to the calibration of r. When we vary r while holding the w f r constant, the mean and standard deviation of loss remain unchanged, but the tail percentile values change markedly. This sensitivity is both a direct and an indirect consequence of a property of the gamma distribution for x. Unlike the normal distribution, which has kurtosis equal to 3 regardless of its variance, the kurtosis of a gamma-distributed variable depends on its parameters. A gamma random variable with mean one and variance r 2 has kurtosis 31 2r 2 , so higher r imposes a more fat-tailed shape on the distribution, which is transmitted to the shape of the distribution for p i x for each obligor i. So long as w fi r is held constant, varying r has no eect on the mean or standard deviation of p i x. However, it is straightforward to show that the kurtosis of p i x equals the kurtosis of x, so increasing r increases the kurtosis of p i x.
Increasing the kurtosis of the p i x has the direct eect of increasing the thickness of the tail of the distribution for loss. This is explored below by substituting an alternative distribution for x which has mean one and variance r 2 but is less kurtotic. The indirect eect of higher kurtosis for p i x is that it magni®es the error induced by the Poisson approximation. To explore the eect of r on the size of the approximation error, we use the methods of Section 3.2 to eliminate the Poisson approximation from the calculations.
The Poisson approximation necessarily contributes to the thickness of the tail in CreditRisk loss distributions. In a Monte Carlo based model, such as CreditMetrics, an obligor can default no more than once, so no more than x defaults can be suered. Under the Poisson approximation, a single obligor can be counted in default any number of times (albeit with very small probabilities of multiple defaults). Thus, CreditRisk assigns a positive probability to the number of defaults exceeding the number of obligors. No matter how the portfolio is constructed and how the two models are calibrated, there must be a . The Monte Carlo version is similar to that outlined in Section 3.2, except that default of obligor i, conditional on x, is drawn as a Bernoulli random variate with probability p i x, rather than using the latent variable approach of Eq. (13). This avoids the small approximation error induced by Eq. (14), but otherwise imposes exactly the same distributional assumptions and functional forms as the standard CreditRisk model. We conduct similar Monte Carlo exercises to explore alternative distributional assumptions for x. Say that x is distributed such that x 2 $ GammaaY b. As described in Appendix D, it is straightforward to solve for parameters aY b such that the ix 1 and Varx r 2 . Although this x matches the mean and variance of the standard CreditRisk gamma-distributed risk factor, it is much less kurtotic. The``gamma-squared'' distribution is compared to the ordinary gamma distribution in Fig. 2 . The top panel plots the cdfs for a gamma distributed variable (solid line) and a gamma-squared distributed variable (dashed line). Both variables have mean one and variance one. The two distributions appear to be quite similar, and indeed would be dicult to distinguish empirically. Nonetheless, as shown in the bottom panel, the two distributions dier substantially in the tails. The 99.9th percentiles are 6.91 and 5.58 for the gamma and gamma-squared distributions, respectively. The 99.97th percentiles are 8.11 vs. 6.20.
The results of both exercises on an Average quality portfolio are shown in Table 7 . 28 The standard CreditRisk results for r 1X5 and r 4X0 (columns 1 and 4) are taken from Table 3 . Results for the Monte Carlo version of CreditRisk are shown in columns 2 and 5. For the moderate value of r 1X5, the 99.97th percentile value is reduced by under two percent. For the larger value r 4X0, however, the 99.97th percentile value is reduced by over eight percent. The higher the value of r, the higher the probability of large conditional default probabilities. As the validity of the Poisson approximation thus breaks down for high r, so does the accuracy of the analytic CreditRisk methodology.
Results for the modi®ed CreditRisk with x 2 gamma-distributed are shown in columns 3 and 6. For both values of r, the mean and standard deviation of portfolio loss are roughly as before, but the tail percentiles are quite signi®-cantly reduced. Indeed, the 99.97th percentile value for the modi®ed model under r 1X5 is even less than the corresponding CreditMetrics value. This demonstrates the critical importance of the shape of the distribution of the systemic risk factor.
Discussion
This paper demonstrates that there is no unbridgeable dierence in the views of portfolio credit risk embodied in CreditMetrics and CreditRisk . If we consider the restricted form of CreditMetrics used in the analysis, then each model can be mapped into the mathematical framework of the other, so that the primary sources of discrepancy in results are dierences in distributional assumptions and functional forms. Simulations are constructed for a wide range of plausible loan portfolios and correlation parameters. The results suggest a number of general conclusions. First, the two models perform very similarly on an average quality commercial loan portfolio when the CreditRisk volatility parameter r is given a low value. Both models demand higher capital on lower quality portfolios, but CreditRisk is somewhat more sensitive to credit quality than the two-state version of CreditMetrics. It should be emphasized, however, that the full implementation of CreditMetrics encompasses a broader notion of credit risk, and is likely to produce somewhat larger tail percentiles than our restricted version.
Second, results do not depend very strongly on the distribution of loan sizes within the portfolio, at least within the range of size concentration normally observed in bank portfolios. The discretization of loan sizes in CreditRisk has negligible impact.
Third, both models are highly sensitive to the volatility of default probabilities, or, equivalently, to the average default correlations in the portfolio. When the standard deviation of the default probabilities is doubled, required capital increases by two to three times.
Finally, the models are highly sensitive to the shape of the implied distribution for the systemic risk factors. CreditMetrics, which implies a relatively thin-tailed distribution, reports relatively low tail percentile values for portfolio loss. The tail of CreditRisk depends strongly on the parameter r, which de- termines the kurtosis (but not the mean or variance) of the distribution of portfolio loss. Choosing less kurtotic alternatives to the gamma distribution used in CreditRisk sharply reduces its tail percentile values for loss without aecting the mean and variance.
This sensitivity ought to be of primary concern to practitioners. It is dicult enough to measure expected default probabilities and their volatility. Capital decisions, however, depend on extreme tail percentile values of the loss distribution, which in turn depend on higher moments of the distribution of the systemic risk factors. These higher moments cannot be estimated with any precision given available data. Thus, the models are more likely to provide reliable measures for comparing the relative levels of risk in two portfolios than to establish authoritatively absolute levels of capital required for any given portfolio.
its expected value, p f x p a " p f . In the ®rst two columns of Table 8 , we present for each rating grade the empirical values of " p and i1a n in the S&P data. The third column presents the observed variance of default rates, p, expressed in normalized form. The fourth column gives the implied normalized volatilities for the unobserved true conditional default probabilities.
For the highest grades, AAA and AA, no defaults occurred in the S&P sample, so it is impossible to estimate a volatility for these grades. Among the A obligors, only ®ve defaults were observed in the sample, so the default volatility is undoubtedly measured with considerable imprecision. Therefore, calibration of the normalized volatilities for these grades requires some judgment. Our chosen values for these ratios are given in the ®nal column of Table 8 . It is assumed that normalized volatilities are somewhat higher for the top grades, but that the estimated value for grade A is implausibly high. For the lower grades, the empirical estimates are made with greater precision (due to the larger number of defaults in sample), so these values are maintained.
